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Corruption is a problem that continues to plague developed and developing countries worldwide. Previous studies have
explored the negative implications of corruption on several aspects of human development, but, despite its serious and
long-lasting consequences, the impact of corruption on educational outcomes has started to receive attention only in
recent years. This study empirically investigates the relationship between corruption and educational outcomes, using a
sample of 50 countries. Study findings show that corruption is negatively associated with educational outcomes, after
controlling for other variables, and suggest that continued efforts be made to control corruption. 
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Corruption, defined as the misuse of public office for
personal gain (Klitgaard, MacLean-Abaroa, & Parris,
2001), continues to plague both developed and develop-
ing countries worldwide. Corruption flourishes when an
organization or a public official has monopoly control
over certain goods or services, has discretionary power,
and has no accountability (Klitgaard, 1988).1 Previous
studies have explored the negative implications of cor-
ruption on several aspects of human capital and econom-
ic development (e.g., Akçay, 2006; Alesina & Weder,
2002; Gupta, Davoodi, & Tiongson, 2000; Mauro, 1995,
1998; Transparency International, 2006; Treisman,
2000). Despite its serious and long-lasting conse-
quences, corruption in the educational system is a topic
that has started to receive attention only in recent years
(Azfar & Gurgur, 2001; Heyneman, 2004; Rumyantseva,
2005). This study empirically investigated the relation-
ship of corruption on two measures of educational out-
comes. The first indicator was a measure of educational
quality defined by the country average scores on the
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) 2003, and the second indicator was a gauge of
educational quantity using the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s
(UNESCO) measure of school life-expectancy (SLE). 
Literature Review 
Consequences of Corruption 
The question of whether the presence of corruption is
detrimental or beneficial to economic activity sounds
ironic, yet it has been a controversial question among
some economists (Meon & Sekkat, 2005). An older
school of thought proposed that corruption may pro-
mote or “grease the wheels” of growth, suggesting that
corruption can have positive effects (Leff, 1964; Nye,
1967). The grease-the-wheels point of view suggested
that corruption may compensate for bad governance and
remove uncertainty, which may result  in increased
investments (Leff, 1964). Nye (1967) suggested that cor-
ruption may be beneficial for growth under certain con-
ditions, while it can be detrimental in other circum-
stances. However, Kauffman and Wei (1999), using data
from three worldwide firm-level surveys, countered the
“efficient grease” theory, finding that firms that paid more
in bribes spent more, not less, time with bureaucrats
negotiating regulations and had a higher, not lower, cost
of capital. More recent empirical investigations on cor-
ruption have also focused on the efficiency-reducing
aspect of corruption, indicating that corruption “sands
the wheels” of growth and reduces economic activity. In
a study of 71 countries, Meon and Sekkat (2005) found
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a negative effect of corruption on growth and invest-
ment, supporting the sand-the-wheels view of corrup-
tion. In one of the earliest studies quantifying the rela-
tionship between corruption and growth, Mauro (1995)
observed the significant negative relationship between
corruption on growth and investment 
Other factors that influence economic growth are
related to the level of foreign direct investments and the
quality and productivity of investments. Habib and
Zurawicki (2002) indicated that corruption is a serious
deterrent to foreign direct investments and suggested
that foreign investors generally avoid corruption because
it can create operational inefficiencies. Tanzi and
Davoodi (1997) found a negative relationship between
corruption and the quality of investments, in which
increasing public investment resulted in reduced growth
and productivity and, ultimately, lower-quality outputs.
Examples include government infrastructure projects
costing more than they should but yielding poor results
or products.
Corruption’s impact on other significant areas of
human capital development has also been documented.
Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (2002) pointed out
that high levels of corruption worsen income inequality
and poverty; for example and one standard deviation
increase in corruption increases the Gini coefficient of
income inequality by an estimated 11 points and reduces
income growth of the poor by 4.7 percentage points.
Akçay (2006) indicated that, in a study of 63 countries,
corruption indices and human development had a statis-
tically significant negative relationship. Because many of
the development indicators affected are associated with
human capital factors and because a country’s economic
growth depends on development of its labor force, a neg-
ative relationship between corruption and human devel-
opment may affect a country’s overall progress. Several
studies have, in fact, focused on the relationship between
economic growth and human capital (UNESCO, 2004). 
Corruption and poverty are highly correlated
(Transparency International, 2006), yet the direction of
causality—that is, does corruption cause poverty or
poverty cause corruption?—is not always evident.
Although some researchers have found a correlation
between a country’s development and the incidence of
corruption (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Husted, 1999;
Treisman, 2000), others found wide variances among
groups of countries at similar stages of development
(Kauffman, 1997). Still others have investigated whether
corrupt governments receive less foreign aid, but such
studies have yielded no evidence to support such a con-
clusion (Alesina & Weder, 2002). Although corruption
exists in all countries, it tends to be more damaging to
poor countries, where it can undermine the rule of law
and cripple economic and political developments
(Klitgaard et al., 2001). Corruption is a serious problem
because it can minimize government revenue-generating
efforts while at the same time drain away scarce resources
that could otherwise be used for the development of a
country’s social services and infrastructure (Tanzi &
Davoodi, 1997). In summary, research has shown that
corruption reduces economic growth, creates barriers to
investment, promotes income inequalities, influences
government expenditures, and worsens factors related to
overall human development.
Corruption and Education 
Mauro (1997) looked at corruption and its effect on the
composition of government expenditures and found that
government expenditure on education was negatively
and significantly associated with corruption, after con-
trolling for gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
Corrupt countries were found to spend less on education
as a percentage of their GDP; Mauro (1998) indicated
that if a country improves its corruption index by one
standard deviation, government spending on education
can increase by around a half percent of GDP. The harm
of the lack of investment in education by more corrupt
countries is a serious problem (Kauffman, 1997). 
In an empirical study of corruption in one develop-
ing country, Azfar and Gurgur (2001) found that a dis-
proportionate burden of corruption was placed on the
poor and indicated that corruption reduced test scores,
lowered national ranking of schools, and raised variation
of test results across schools. Gupta, Davoodi, and
Tiongson (2000) suggested that corruption increases the
cost and lowers the quality of education services. 
It is not a surprise that the education sector is a tar-
get for corrupt officials, because education is the largest
or second-largest budget item in most countries and
opportunities for corrupt practices are numerous (U4
Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2006). In some coun-
tries, education consumes an estimated 30 percent of the
national budget, creating a potential wide avenue for cor-
ruption (Transparency International, 2006). Corruption
in education is by no means limited to certain countries
or regions; in fact, a six-year study of more than 60 coun-
tries showed that corruption in the education sector is
present in countries ranging from those with poorly gov-
erned, low-paid staff to affluent Western democracies
(Hallak & Poisson, 2007). 
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Corruption in the educational sector can occur at
several levels: at the policy level, the ministry or depart-
ment level, and the school or administrative level.
Insufficient resources may be allocated for education as a
result of corrupt practices, or resources may be diverted
en route to schools. Examples of corruption in the edu-
cation sector are numerous: ghost schools that do not
exist but have expenses that find their way into the pock-
ets of politicians, teachers not showing up for work but
collecting salaries, exams being sold to students, and
widespread corruption in textbook procurement and
school construction that result in books and classrooms
costing many times more than they should (Azfar, 2001;
Transparency International, 2005). In addition, new
opportunities for corruption have been introduced with
decentralization, privatization, and outsourcing
(UNESCO, 2004). Corruption also affects the moral fab-
ric of societies, undermines incentives for young people
to work hard, and teaches easier means to get ahead
(Rumyantseva, 2005). Corrupt educational institutions
weaken rather than strengthen a nation’s social cohesion
(Heyneman, 2004). Although corruption in general is a
large problem for many countries, corruption in the edu-
cation sector is even more disturbing, because it under-
mines the trust and foundation upon which societies are
built and takes advantage of those that most need help. 
The Study’s Research Question
Studies have suggested that corruption is a systematic
feature of many economies and that it constitutes a sig-
nificant impediment to economic growth (e.g., Azfar,
Lee, & Swamy, 2001; Klitgaard et al., 2001). Other stud-
ies have drawn the link between corruption and educa-
tion (Azfar & Gurgur, 2001; Heyneman, 2004; Mauro,
1998), but the relationship of corruption to educational
outcomes on a cross-country level has yet to be explored.
This paper examines the association between the per-
ceived level of corruption and educational outcomes as
measured on a country level. 
With regard to educational outcomes, such as stu-
dent achievement, Summers and Wolfe (1977) suggest-
ed that achievement (ACH) was a function of a student’s
genetic background and socioeconomic status (GSES),
teacher quality (TQ), nonteacher school quality (SQ),
and peer group characteristics (PG). Summers and Wolfe
presented the reduced equation as follows: ACH = f
(GSES, TQ, SQ, PG). Because corruption can have an
association with contextual, environmental variables
such as SES and PG, the main question this study asked
was this: Does corruption have a significant association
with educational outcomes, after controlling for other
variables? The signs of the coefficients were expected to
be negative, indicating that higher corruption was asso-
ciated with lower educational outcomes. 
Data and Methods
This study used several sources of data and focused on
two educational outcome measures (i.e., two dependent
variables) related to levels of educational quality and
quantity. The educational quality outcome was a com-
posite index derived using each country’s average science
and mathematics scores on the TIMSS 2003. The educa-
tional quantity measure used the school life-expectancy
(SLE) indicator developed by UNESCO. 
Sample
Fifty countries  (N = 50) were included in the sample.2
Thailand, Canada, and the Czech Republic did not par-
ticipate in the TIMSS 2003 study, but their scores from
the TIMSS 1999 were included in order to increase the
limited sample size. Based on World Bank gross national
product (GNP) per capita income groupings,3 the sam-
ple contained two low-income countries (4%), 15 lower-
middle–income countries (30%), 13 upper-
middle–income countries (26%), and 20 high-income
countries (40%).  
Dependent Variables
Educational performance outcomes were measured
using the cross-country TIMSS 2003.4 These scores
measure 4th and 8th grade students’ science and mathe-
matics performance from the countries that participated
in the study (Martin, Mullis, & Chrostowski, 2004). The
TIMSS 2003 was a project of the International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational
Achievement directed by the TIMSS International Study
Center. An educational performance index (EPI) was
constructed by averaging each country’s latest 8th grade
TIMSS science and mathematics scores. The EPI (M =
473.87, SD = 71.79) was used in place of either science
or mathematics 8th grade scores since the subject-area
scores were so highly correlated (r = .95, p < 0.001).
Based on the EPI, the highest-performing countries were
Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea; the lowest per-
formers were South Africa, Ghana, and Saudi Arabia.
For the measure of educational quantity, the study
used the SLE 2003 indicator developed by UNESCO.
The SLE indicator (M = 14.29, SD = 2.62) measured the
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average number of years of schooling that a 5-year-old
child could expect to receive in the future (Motivans,
2005). School life-expectancy can be used to assess the
overall level of performance of an educational system, in
terms of average duration of participation. As an average,
SLE exhibits variation, since some students spend a great
amount of time in school and others never go to school
at all. A limitation is that it measures duration of educa-
tion only in years and does not account for variations in
numbers of school hours that students may accumulate
during a year. Another limitation is that SLE does not
distinguish between students who complete a grade level
within one year and those who repeat the grade level, so
countries with high repetition levels may have higher
SLEs. School life-expectancy can be viewed as a measure
of a country’s educational progress and provides a “per-
spective on educational attainment of the adult popula-
tion in the near future” (UNESCO–UIS/OECD, 2005, p.
21) and it is similar to another commonly used develop-
ment related indicator, life expectancy at birth. The
countries with the highest SLEs were Australia, Belgium,
and New Zealand (more than 19 years); the lowest were
Ghana, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia (less than 10 years). 
Independent Variable
The main independent variable was corruption as meas-
ured by Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) 2003 (M = 4.55, SD = 2.34).
The CPI is an annual composite index that ranks more
than 130 countries by perceived levels of corruption
(Transparency International, 2003).5 Corruption, by its
very nature, is a difficult construct to measure because it
leaves no paper trail. The CPI is determined by surveys
of business people and assessments by country analysts.6
In this study, the CPI variable order was reversed for eas-
ier interpretation of results; the reordered CPI values
indicated that higher figures meant higher perceived lev-
els of corruption (high corruption; maximum rating of
10), while lower figures meant lower perceived levels of
corruption (low corruption; minimum rating of 1). The
CPI 2003 combined assessments from the past three
years in order to reduce large variations in scoring due to
random effects. It should be noted that CPI is an overall
measure of corruption and does not specifically measure
corruption in the education sector. Based on the CPI, the
countries that rated the lowest in corruption were
Finland, New Zealand, and Singapore; countries that
rated the highest on corruption were Indonesia, Serbia,
and Macedonia. The expected sign of the CPI coefficient
was negative.
Control Variables
The analyses controlled for the average size of house-
holds and the state of freedom in a country. Since sever-
al articles have discussed the exceptional performance of
countries such as Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong on the TIMSS (Aun, Riley, Atputhasamy, &
Subramaniam, 2006; House, 2005), a regional dummy
variable was used for Asia Pacific (APAC) countries in the
sample (excluding Australia/Oceania). The expected sign
of the APAC coefficient was positive in terms of educa-
tional quality. 
In reviewing factors that have an effect on education-
al performance, Hanushek (1989) found no strong or
systematic relationship between school expenditures and
school performance. In a review of 377 studies that dealt
with input factors that affected education, Hanushek
(1997) pointed out that a majority of empirical studies
yielded statistically nonsignificant findings for factors
such as teacher/pupil ratio, teacher education/salary,
expenditure per pupil, and administrative inputs.
Instead, family background explained the differences in
achievement; on average, children of wealthier parents
performed better (Hanushek, 1992). Family inputs
included variables such as income, parental education,
and family size. Hanushek (1992) asserted that family
size directly affects children’s achievement scores on
tests, indicating that children from smaller households
perform better. Country average household size (HHS)
was used as a control variable (M = 1.25, SD = .31). Since
the data were positively skewed (much like GNP per
capita), HHS data were transformed using the natural
log. Household size data were sourced from
Encyclopedia Britannica’s Geoanalyzer (2007), for years
ranging from 1997 to 2001. Estimates from the most
recent year were used in the analysis. The expected sign
of the HHS coefficient was negative. 
Household size can also be thought of as a proxy
variable for the national wealth of a country because
HHS and GNP per capita are highly correlated (r = .60),
with lower-income countries having more members per
household as compared to wealthier nations. GNP per
capita is strongly linked with other social and economic
indicators of a country; generally, people living in coun-
tries with higher GNP per capita tend to have higher lit-
eracy rates, longer life expectancies, better access to safe
water, and lower infant mortality rates (World Bank
Group, 2001). It is important to control for per capita
income measures, but due to extremely high multi-
collinearity with corruption (r = .87), GNP per capita
was not directly used in this study as a control variable.7
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In one cross-country study, corruption was found to
have a significant effect on several indicators of education
services, but once per capita income was added as a con-
trol variable, corruption ceased to be significantly corre-
lated with indicators such as primary school enrollment
rates and illiteracy rates (Gupta et al., 2000). 
In addition, a country’s level of political and civil
freedom or level of democracy was used as a control vari-
able in this study. Treisman (2000) indicated that a coun-
try’s long-standing history of democracy could be an
important deterrent to corruption, given that countries
with a history of democratic governance have built sys-
tems of checks and balances over time. For the freedom
variable (FREE), Freedom House’s Freedom in the World
Survey 2003, published in 2004, was used. The survey
numerically rated 192 countries and 18 disputed territo-
ries in order to create a freedom index (M = 5.4, SD =
1.77) based on ratings of political rights and civil liber-
ties. (Political rights referred to the right to participate in
the political process; civil liberties referred to freedom to
develop opinions, institutions, and personal autonomy
without state interference.) The freedom index, an aver-
age of both political rights and civil liberties scores,
assigned a freedom status to the countries that ranged
from “not free” to “free.” For this study, the index order
was reversed so that countries with low scores (1 mini-
mum) were “not free” and those with high scores (7 max-
imum) were “free.” Although conventional wisdom may
suggest that more democratic or freer societies produce
better-performing students, in a series of case studies,
Carnoy and Samoff (1989) indicated that some socialist
states have been more successful in developing high-
quality mass education than capitalist states. Carnoy and
Marshall (2005) stated that authoritarian or corporatist
regimes could be highly effective in creating a social con-
text for high economic growth and academic achieve-
ment, as was the case in Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea.
All descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 (see
page 9).
Analytic Strategy 
To determine whether corruption had a significant rela-
tionship with the dependent variables (EPI and SLE),
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models present-
ed in several stages were used. Using OLS has its limita-
tions however and the factors that affect education indi-
cators are often poorly captured by aggregate indicators
(Gupta et al., 2000). Bivariate correlations of CPI
between EPI and SLE, as well as all control variables,
produced baseline regression coefficients. The correla-
tions answered the basic question of this study: Was
there an association between corruption and educational
outcomes, and, if so, how strong were the associations?
The simple correlations, however, did not indicate
whether the relationship between corruption and educa-
tional outcomes held, once the study controlled for other
variables. To better understand this relationship, control
variables were then entered one at a time to build the rest
of the models. SAS was used to estimate all regression
coefficients and a macro was employed  to generate
White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent (HC3) standard
error estimates (Hayes & Cai, in press).
Results
Bivariate correlations showed the relationship of CPI
with the EPI and SLE and all the control variables. As
expected, the simple correlations (see Table 2, page 9)
between CPI and EPI (r = -.43, p < .001) and SLE (r = -
.75, p < .001) were negative and statistically significant
(α = .05), indicating that countries with higher CPI’s had
lower EPI and SLE indicators. 
The OLS regression models, with all the control vari-
ables entered, showed a similar association for both EPI
and SLE (see Table 3, page 10). For the EPI in model 4,
CPI remained statistically significant (p = .02) even after
controlling for HHS, FREE, and APAC. Together, the four
variables (CPI, HHS, FREE, and APAC) explained 57
percent of the overall variance in the EPI, F(4,45) =
12.55, p < .001. Household size and APAC were statisti-
cally significant with a negative coefficient for HHS and
a positive coefficient for APAC. The FREE coefficient was
negative but was not statistically significant (p > .05). For
SLE, the CPI coefficient was negative, and it was the only
variable that remained statistically significant (p < .001)
even after controlling for all other variables. In model 6,
CPI and HHS were both statistically significant, but HHS
lost significance (p > .05) once FREE was included in
model 7. Together, CPI, HHS, FREE, and APAC in model
8 explained 68 percent of the overall variance in the SLE,
F(4,45) = 22.31, p < .001. In addition, with the SLE
regressions, all control variable coefficients were negative
but were not statistically significant (all p’s > .05). 
Discussion
The statistically significant negative association between
corruption and the EPI and SLE—even after controlling
for HHS, FREE, and APAC—suggests that an increase in
corruption is associated with lower educational out-
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comes. On average, a one-point increase in the CPI (an
increase in corruption) decreases TIMSS scores by
around 8.5 points (or around 11.5 percent of one stan-
dard deviation change in the EPI). While not a large
effect size, corruption can detract from human capital
building efforts. This is in line with previous research
that has shown that corruption has been found to lower
test scores (Azfar & Gurgur, 2001). The strong relation-
ship between corruption and household sizes is evident
in the results, implying the importance of resource con-
straints on the quality of education as suggested by
Hanushek (1992).
The APAC variable also indicates that, on average,
Asia Pacific countries performed better on the EPI by one
standard deviation, which is a large effect size. Several
interpretations of higher achievement in these nations
are possible. For example, it could be a result of a strong
Confucian culture, which gives education great impor-
tance (Leung, 2002) or a result of strong development
policies enacted over time by powerful regimes, as in the
case of several “Asian Tigers” (Ramirez, Luo, Schofer, &
Meyer, 2006).
Although not statistically significant, the FREE vari-
able’s coefficient indicates that countries with greater
freedom and democracy typically score lower on the EPI
yet have a greater number of years of expected educa-
tion, as shown with the SLE variable. Quantity (more
years of education) does not necessarily lead to better
performance; that is, having more years of education
does not automatically mean better quality of learning.
Of note is that the countries with the highest TIMSS per-
formance did not have a long-standing history of democ-
racy. Similarly, Akçay (2006) investigated the association
of the democracy and corruption variables with human
development and also did not find a significant relation-
ship between democracy and human development, after
including regional dummy variables.   
The negative coefficient associated with SLE suggests
that, on average, for every point increase in the CPI, SLE
decreases by .65 years (nearly 8 months or around 25
percent of one standard deviation in SLE), holding all
other variables constant. In other words, on average,
children in more corrupt countries can expect to receive
fewer years of schooling. Again, the effect size associated
with corruption may not be large, but it is important to
emphasize that corruption retains its significance even
with the inclusion of the control variables, indicating a
strong relationship between corruption and educational
outcome measures of quality and quantity. Gupta et al.’s
(2000) research indicated that, controlling for other vari-
ables, corruption was significantly associated with
increased primary school dropout rates. As dropout rates
increase, SLE is expected to decrease, as supported by
the current study. While HHS and APAC retain their sig-
nificance in the full EPI model (model 4), no other con-
trol variable retains its significance in relation to SLE
(model 8). The loss of significance of HHS could imply
that the resource constraints associated with a greater
number of household members affect educational quali-
ty and not the number of years of expected schooling. 
Conclusion
Empirical studies analyzing the effects of corruption have
revealed corruption’s significant impact on various
aspects of human capital and economic development.
This study explored the relationship between corruption
and educational outcomes (in terms of quality and quan-
tity) in the sample of 50 countries. Results indicated a
statistically significant negative relationship between cor-
ruption and both TIMSS performance and SLE indica-
tors, while controlling for other variables. Policymakers
should pay heed to the potential impact of corruption,
especially since, in many instances, education is seen as
a means of combating corruption. Ongoing efforts that
involve adding resources and finding ways to improve
education are critical, but corruption has the potential of
holding back or sabotaging a country’s educational
progress—much like taking two steps forward and one
step back. If the economic development of a country is
related to its performance in science and mathematics,
removing potential roadblocks to progress becomes even
more important. Although corruption is an unpleasant
and difficult topic to address, turning a blind eye to it
does not make it go away but actually encourages it.
Eliminating corruption involves a culture change and a
shift in mind-set along with implementation of account-
ability systems and processes. By the very nature of the
change, reducing the corruption levels in a country will
take time.
Because education is viewed as an important tool in
the war against corruption, it becomes increasingly
important to focus on controlling corruption and find
ways to track and minimize it. In summary, this study
contributes to the growing body of knowledge that looks
at the relationship between corruption and education





1.   Klitgaard uses a stylized equation, 
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability.
2.   The term “countries” is used even though some areas are actually
territories, such as Hong Kong. Countries included Armenia,
Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Hong
Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palestinian National Authority,
Philippines, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, and the United States.
3.   Economies were categorized according to World Bank income
groupings based on GNP per capita: low income, $875 or less;
lower-middle income, $876–$3,465; upper-middle income,
$3,466–$10,725; and high income, $10,726 or more.
4.   TIMSS is conducted on a four-year cycle: the first round was
conducted in 1995 and the second round in 1999.
5.   The World Bank constructs a similar yearly corruption index,
called the Control of Corruption Index, which is almost perfectly
correlated with the CPI (r = .972).
6.   Survey sources for the CPI 2003 included Columbia University,
the Economist Intelligence Unit, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Freedom House,
Information International, the Institute for Management and
Development (IMD), a multilateral development bank, Political and
Economic Risk Consultancy, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Gallup
International on behalf of Transparency International, the World
Bank, the World Economic Forum, and the World Markets Research
Centre.
7.   Finding statistical significance with the variables is difficult due
to increased standard errors.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables (N = 50)
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Source
Educational Performance
Index
254.00 592.00 473.87 71.80 TIMSS


















Freedom 1.00 7.00 5.40 1.77 Freedom House
Asia Pacific 0.00 1.00 .18 .39
Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Among Variables (N = 50)
Variable EPI SLE CPI HHS FREE APAC
Educational Performance Index (EPI) 1 .633** -.425** -.587** .373** .284*
School Life Expectancy (SLE) 1 -749** -.596** .606** -.101
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 1 .399** -.440** .039
Average Household Size, log (HHS) 1 -.774** .145
Freedom (FREE) 1 -.062
Asia Pacific (APAC) Dummy 1
*Correlation is significant at the 5 percent level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 3. OLS Regression Results
Model



























































F 18.80 19.28 12.42 12.55 65.12 44.49 29.52 22.31
R
2 .18 .39 .42 .57 .56 .67 .68 .68
p-value 
(significance of model) 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001
Note: Dependent variable is the Educational Performance Index in Models 1-4; 
dependent variable is school life-expectancy in models 5-8 (N=50). 
*Correlation is significant at the 5 percent level (2-tailed). Figures in parentheses are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. A high value in the corruption index indicates higher levels of perceived 
corruption.
**Correlation is significant at the 1 percent level.
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